Uganda has no statutory provision governing property acquired by a couple during their married life or prior to marriage. Under common law there was a presumption that all the property in matrimonial home belonged to the husband.
Mawji v. R
There is a natural presumption in absence of evidence to the contrary that property in a matrimonial home is that of a husband.
Under Registration of Titles Act, certificate of title is conclusive evidence of ownership unless challenged by fraud or deceit.
Notwithstanding the above, over the time the courts have developed the doctrine of equity to counter the injustice of rules of legal ownership and protection of women.
Some of these doctrines include;
Resultant trust
This arises where one party has contributed money in the purchase of property in question. The law assumes that the legal owner is the trustee of the other party who is not registered.
In Allen v. Allen, 1961 WLR 1186
The husband had agreed before marriage to purchase a house from her mother in law, after the purchase he put it in his sole name. During the subsistence of marriage his wife applied her income towards household expenses while the husband paid the mortgage instalments. During dissolution of marriage the husband sought to repossess the whole property as the sole owner but the wife counter claimed for a fair share.
The court said that it was not automatic that equal shares arose where the husband and the wife were wage earners. However the court agreed with the wife and said she was entitled to a share due to her house hold contribution.
In a latter case the court took a different view in Pettit v. Pettit [1968] 2 All ER 388
A wife purchased property, the husband undertook internal decoration work and build a wardrobe in it, he also laid a lawn and also constructed an ornamental well and a side wall in the garden all these improved the value of the property.
Issue, whether the husband by reason of his expenditure and labour was entitled to claim a beneficial interest in the proceeds of sale of property.
Held, the husband was not entitled to an interest in his wife’s property merely because he had done during his leisure time jobs which husbands normally did. There was no justification for imputing common intention that husband should acquire beneficial interest in respect of the work that he did.
In Falconer v. Falconer,
The husband and wife were married in 1960. In 1961 when they were living in a flat, they decided to buy a plot of land and build a house on it. The price of the plot was £525 of which the wife’s mother provided £80 and the balance was raised by mortgage buy the wife as the mortgagor and the husband joining as a surety. In the construction of the house, the wife was the mortgagor, the husband’s father guaranteed mortgage repayment for 17 months and the husband paid £105 out of his money. The husband was paying the wife for house keeping until 1967 when the wife committed adultery and on dissolution of marriage.
Held, the plot of land was solely obtained by the wife’s efforts and contribution and hence belonged to her, but the house was paid for by both parties and belonged to them jointly in equal shares.
Where the property in question is matrimonial home, the law imputes an intention to create a trust against each other especially where there is contribution substantially to the purchase.
Common intention cannot be inferred where there is indirect contribution.
In Gissing v. Gissing, the parties purchased a matrimonial home and conveyed it in the sole name of the appellant. There was no express agreement as to how beneficial interest in the matrimonial home should be held. The respondent made no direct contribution towards the initial deposit or legal charges nor to the mortgage instalments. The respondent provided some furniture and some equipment for the house and for improving the lawn; she also paid for her clothes and for her son’s clothes.
It was not suggested that either the respondent’s efforts or earnings made it possible for the appellant to raise the loan or the mortgage. The marriage broke down and the respondent obtained decree absolute.
Issue, whether the respondent had any beneficial interest in former matrimonial home?
Held, on the facts, it was not possible to draw any inference that there was common intention that the respondent should have any beneficial interest in the matrimonial home. The court could not ascribe intentions which the parties never had, nor can the ownership of property be affected by mere fact that harmony has been replaced by discord.
Ulrich v. Ulrich & Felton
Before their marriage, the parties bought a bungalow. The wife contributed £415 and the husband obtained a mortgage for the rest of the money i.e. £2000. The bungalow was conveyed in the husband alone, it was intended to become their matrimonial home. After their marriage they both continued with their work, their joint earnings being used for household expenses. After delivering an issue of the marriage the wife ceased to work to look after the boy. After resuming work the wife committed adultery and the husband left the matrimonial home and on obtaining divorce it was agreed that the matrimonial house had to be sold.
Held, money contributed before marriage was the same as that contributed after, the husband and the wife were entitled to the house in equity. A variation of ante nuptial settlement should be fair and the husband should take half of his share of equity of redemption of the house and the wife’s half should be put in trust in whole or in part for the child of the marriage.
Section 26 of the divorce Act provides that, when a decree of dissolution of marriage or of judicial separation is pronounced on account of adultery by the wife, and the wife is entitled to any property, the court may, notwithstanding the existence of the disability of coverture, order the whole or any part of the property to be settled for the benefit of the husband, or of the children of the marriage, or of both.
In Edita Nakiyingi v. Merekizadeki, the plaintiff and the defendant were married under customary law and the father of the defendant gave a kibanja to the plaintiff on which the plaintiff and the defendant erected a house. The wife contributed corrugated iron sheets plus tendering the kibanja and growing some crops. After the collapse of marriage;
Held, where the matrimonial home is beneficially owned by the husband and the wife jointly in equity or other shares under trust for sale, neither party was entitled as a right to expel the other and thus deprive him or her of his/her share. In the circumstances of the instant case, the kibanja and the house were beneficially owned by the husband and the wife under a trust for sale having arisen out of the substantial contribution by the wife towards the development of the kibanja and building of the house and thus the husband could not exclude the wife from the enjoyment of their joint endeavours.
a) Bank accounts
In the case of Re Bishop, the court considered the rules governing joint accounts.
In this case it was stated that, where spouses opened a joint account to be drawn by either and any investment made by the money from the account belongs to the person in whose name the investment was purchased and if one spouse made a purchase in their joint names there was no equity to displace joint legal ownership. Any investment purchased with the money from the account in the name of either spouse belonged beneficially to that spouse and on the husband’s death the balance standing to the credit of the joint account accrued beneficially to the wife.
In Jones v Maynard
In May, 1941, a husband and wife each had a banking account, but, as the husband was to go abroad on war service, it was decided that their joint incomes should be paid into the husband’s account on which the wife was given power to draw. From time to time money was withdrawn from the account by both parties for their own purposes, and, in particular, for investments which were made in the name of the husband. In July, 1948, the marriage was dissolved.
Held – On the evidence the intention of the parties was to constitute a pool of their resources in the form of a joint account; it was not consistent with that intention to divide the moneys in the account and the investments made with moneys withdrawn therefrom by reference to the amounts respectively contributed to the account by each of them; and, therefore, the husband must be regarded as trustee for the wife of one-half of the investments and of the balance of the account.
In Harrods v. Tester
A husband opened a banking account in his wife’s name, all payments into the account being made by the husband. The account was used for domestic and other purposes. The wife always asked for her husband’s consent before she drew on the account and she had given the bank the mandate to allow her husband to draw on the account. Judgement creditors sought to garnishee the account.
Held, on the facts there was a resulting trust in favour of the husband, and as the moneys were therefore the property of the husband, the wife’s creditors could not garnishee the account although it was in her name.
In law there is a presumption that wedding gifts belong from the person on whose side they originated. In Samson v. Samson, it was stated that there is no principle of law that wedding presents are joint wedding presents to both spouses. If there is evidence of intention on the part of the donor, that may determine whether the gift belongs to one spouse or both, but if there is no such evidence, the inference may be drawn that gifts from the relatives or friends of a spouse were gifts to that spouse. Property which was given to one spouse may also become the property of both by subsequent conduct.
Chattels and household furniture, Re Cole
A husband acquired a lease of a large mansion which he furnished by articles mainly bought by himself. After sometime he took the wife to the mansion and after showing her around she handled some articles and he told her it’s all yours. They always considered the furniture to be the property of the wife. When the husband became bankrupt the wife claimed most of the furniture as her property.
Held, where the husband and the wife were living together in a common establishment, possession of the furniture therein followed the legal title to the furniture and although the wife may have use and enjoyment of it, and the facts of this case were equivocal and did not establish a charge of possession on delivery of the furniture to the wife as a gift transferring the property to her. Accordingly there had not been effective or perfected gift to her of the furniture and the husband’s trustee in bankruptcy was entitled to the furniture.
b) Savings from household expenses
Blackwell v. Blackwell
A husband and wife separated in 1941. At that date there was standing to the credit of the wife in the books of a co-operative society a sum of £103 10s which upon the evidence represented moneys saved from a housekeeping allowance made to the wife while the parties were living together. It was contended for the wife that this sum was her own property:—
Held, it was clear that the source of this money was the husband’s weekly allowance and that was sufficient in the absence of any evidence to the contrary that this money was still the property of the husband.
Exceptions
Where the savings are from the wife’s personal effects
Gift to a couple living separately
Money advanced from maintenance
コメント