THE SUPREME COURT HAS REAFFIRMED THAT IT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AN APPEAL ARISING FROM A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL IN A JUDGMENT ARISING FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COURT
- Waboga David
- Mar 20
- 10 min read
The Supreme Court of Uganda has delivered a significant ruling on the jurisdictional authority concerning appeals from the Court of Appeal arising from the Industrial Court. The lead judgment was delivered by Justice Madama JSC, addressing a fundamental legal question: Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal in a judgment arising from the Industrial Court?
In her dissenting judgment, Justice Catherine Bamugemereire of the Supreme Court raised a critical legal issue regarding the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in labour disputes emanating from the Industrial Court.
Furthermore, the Industrial Court’s role in labour dispute resolution is critical to upholding workers' rights and fair employment practices.
Restricting Supreme Court jurisdiction could result in inconsistent legal interpretations and limit judicial oversight on fundamental employment law issues.
Facts
This case concerns a second appeal arising from the Court of Appeal's decision, which dismissed the appellant's appeal against the Industrial Court's ruling. The case originated from the appellant contesting her dismissal from employment by the respondent, leading to the filing of a claim in the Industrial Court on 27th August 2015. The Industrial Court dismissed her claim on 16th March 2017, ruling that her dismissal was lawful. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, which upheld the Industrial Court's decision, affirming the lawfulness of her dismissal. No order as to costs was made.
Grounds of Appeal
Dissatisfied with the Court of Appeal's ruling, the appellant lodged a further appeal to the Supreme Court, presenting twelve grounds of appeal. Two preliminary grounds required determination before proceeding with other substantive issues:
The Court of Appeal erred in law and fact by holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Industrial Court on points of law or mixed law and fact, leading to a miscarriage of justice.
The Court of Appeal erred in law and fact by raising the issue of jurisdiction on its own volition and resolving it without allowing the appellant to address the matter, thereby reaching an erroneous conclusion.
Proceedings Before the Supreme Court
The appeal was heard on 22nd April 2024, with learned counsel Mr. Omunyokol George representing the respondent and Mr. Mukwaya Deogratius Kizito representing the appellant.
Key Legal Arguments
Respondent’s Preliminary Objection
The respondent contended that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the Court of Appeal in its appellate jurisdiction regarding matters originating from the Industrial Court. The respondent relied on DFCU Bank Ltd vs. Donna Kamuti, Supreme Court Civil Application No. 29 of 2019, where the Supreme Court interpreted Article 132 of the Constitution as limiting appeals from the Court of Appeal to instances prescribed by law. The respondent argued that Section 22 of the Labour Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act, 2006, does not explicitly grant appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in Industrial Court matters.
The respondent further emphasized that appellate jurisdiction must be specifically established by statute and cited Baku Raphael Obudra vs. Attorney General, Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 2005 and Zubeda Mohammed vs. Watila & Another, Supreme Court Reference No. 07 of 2016 to reinforce that no statutory provision permits the appellant’s appeal.
Additionally, the respondent noted that the appellant violated Practice Direction No. 02 of 2005 by exceeding the 10-page limit for written submissions and failing to double-space the text, warranting the exclusion of non-compliant pages based on Paul Elvis Owor vs. Nicholas Kanyanya, Supreme Court Civil Application No. 50 of 2021.
Appellant’s Response
The appellant’s counsel argued that the respondent’s preliminary objection was raised without leave of the Court, contrary to Rule 78 of the Supreme Court Rules, and should be dismissed.
He maintained that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Article 132 of the Constitution and Section 7 of the Judicature Act, particularly due to an alleged gap in Section 22 of the Labour Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act, 2006, which does not explicitly declare the Court of Appeal as the final appellate authority in labour disputes.
The appellant’s counsel contended that stare decisis does not preclude the Court from reconsidering prior decisions, citing Rwabugande Moses vs. Uganda, Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 2011 and Uganda Law Society vs. Attorney General, Supreme Court Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 2006.
He further distinguished the present case from DFCU Bank Ltd vs. Donna Kamuti, arguing that Section 22 of the Labour Act does not expressly limit Supreme Court jurisdiction and that the Industrial Court operates similarly to the High Court in first-instance adjudications.
Respondent’s Rejoinder:
The respondent asserted that the preliminary objections were properly raised through written submissions and that the appellant had adequate notice and opportunity to respond.
He argued that the appellant’s reference to a legislative gap in Section 22 was unfounded, stating that if a gap exists, the appellant should pursue a constitutional petition rather than an appeal.
Decision
The appellant contended that the respondent could not challenge the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction without the Court’s leave due to procedural requirements under Rules 78 and 98 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Specifically:
Rule 78 permits an application to strike out a notice of appeal or appeal on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction or procedural deficiencies.
Rule 98(b) restricts a respondent from objecting to the appeal’s competence without first seeking leave of the Court if such objections could have been raised under Rule 78.
The appellant asserted that jurisdictional objections should have been raised via a formal application under Rule 78 rather than at the hearing stage.
However, the Court reaffirmed that jurisdiction is a fundamental issue that can be raised at any stage of proceedings. Any proceedings conducted without jurisdiction are null and void, as supported by Rule 2(2), which empowers the Supreme Court to annul judgments deemed null and void after they are passed.
Statutory Framework Governing Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court examined the legal framework governing jurisdiction, focusing on:
Section 22 of the Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act, 2006, which provides for appeals from the Industrial Court to the Court of Appeal strictly on points of law or jurisdiction. Notably, this provision does not reference the Supreme Court.
Article 132(2) of the Constitution, which stipulates that appeals to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeal must be prescribed by law.
Section 6(1) of the Judicature Act, which allows appeals to the Supreme Court as of right only when the High Court has exercised original jurisdiction and its decision has been reviewed by the Court of Appeal.
Legal Interpretation
Referencing the decision in Baku Raphael Obudra and Obiga Kania vs. Attorney General and Others, Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 2005, the Supreme Court held that a right of appeal must be expressly established by Parliament. The Court reaffirmed that Article 132(2) anticipates an appellate right only if explicitly provided by statute.
Similarly, labor disputes fall under a specialized legal framework distinct from general civil litigation. The Industrial Court, established under the Employment Act, Cap 226, and the Labour Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act, Cap 227, is not a subordinate court under Article 129 of the Constitution. Instead, it operates as a specialized tribunal with arbitration and adjudication powers.
Resolution of Labour Disputes
The Supreme Court reviewed the hierarchical dispute resolution mechanism in labor matters:
Labour Officers: Handle mediation and conciliation of labor disputes.
Industrial Court: Adjudicates disputes referred by Labour Officers and issues final awards.
Court of Appeal: Can hear appeals from the Industrial Court on points of law.
Under Section 93 of the Employment Act, appeals from a Labour Officer’s decision to the Industrial Court are permitted, but decisions of the Industrial Court are deemed final, except on points of law to the Court of Appeal. The law does not grant a further appeal to the Supreme Court.
Ruling
The Supreme Court, in affirming the jurisdictional challenge, held that:
The Industrial Court is a specialized tribunal with its decisions final unless appealed to the Court of Appeal on legal grounds.
The Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act does not provide for further appeals from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court.
Under Article 132(2) of the Constitution, appellate jurisdiction must be legislatively conferred, which is absent in this instance.
There is no such thing as inherent appellate jurisdiction. Any right of appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of the Court of Appeal in cases originating from the industrial Court should not be implied but must be grounded in the laws enacted by Parliament for the purpose.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that it lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal, reinforcing the specialized dispute resolution framework established by Parliament for labor matters.
Dissenting judgment, Justice Catherine Bamugemereire
In her dissenting judgment, Justice Catherine Bamugemereire raised a critical legal issue regarding the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in labour disputes emanating from the Industrial Court. Challenging the prevailing interpretation of appellate jurisdiction as outlined in the Labour Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act, 2006 (LADASA), which restricts appeals from the Industrial Court to the Court of Appeal on points of law only
Constitutional and Statutory Framework
Article 132(2) of the Constitution establishes the Supreme Court as the final court of appeal.
Section 5 of the Judicature Act allows appeals to the Supreme Court in civil matters only on questions of law.
Section 22 of LADASA restricts appeals from the Industrial Court to the Court of Appeal on points of law.
Jurisdictional Dispute
The primary legal question is whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain appeals from the Court of Appeal in labour disputes.
Justice Bamugemereire noted that the Industrial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court, implying that its decisions should be subject to the same appellate hierarchy as other High Court matters.
Court of Appeal’s Role
The Court of Appeal interpreted Section 22 of LADASA as limiting its role to reviewing only points of law.
However, in the present case, the Court of Appeal engaged in a factual analysis, contradicting its own jurisdictional limitations under LADASA.
Legislative Intent and Parliamentary Debates
Justice Bamugemereire examined Hansard records and noted that Parliament intended for the Industrial Court to function as a first-instance court with full judicial powers equivalent to the High Court.
The absence of an express statutory bar on Supreme Court appeals suggests that the framers of LADASA did not intend to foreclose Supreme Court jurisdiction.
Industrial Court as a Subordinate Court:
The LADASA Act created the Industrial Court as a subordinate court with concurrent jurisdiction as the High Court but lacking its unlimited jurisdiction.
The Industrial Court primarily handles employment cases, but there is no clear legislative intent to make the Court of Appeal the final appellate body for such matters.
Comparison with the Parliamentary Elections Act (PEA
The PEA explicitly establishes the finality of the Court of Appeal in election petition matters.
In contrast, there is no such explicit language in the LABADA Act, indicating Parliament did not intend to oust the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
Court of Appeal’s Jurisdictional Overreach
The Court of Appeal exceeded its mandate by deciding on questions of mixed law and fact, despite acknowledging it lacked jurisdiction to do so.
This raises concerns about due process, as litigants lost the opportunity for a fair hearing at the Supreme Court.
The Court of Appeal erroneously closed the door to the appellant to submit on jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal. Although the Court can on its own volition determine its jurisdiction as jurisdiction is a matter of law that goes to the root of the case, the circumstances of this particular case necessitated the Court to allow an opportunity to the parties to address it on the issue. Every case is determined on its peculiar facts.
Supreme Court’s Role in Correcting Jurisdictional Errors
The Supreme Court has the authority to correct the misinterpretation of the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction.
Justice Bamugemereire emphasized that appellate rights should not be unduly restricted, particularly where substantive legal principles are at stake.
The interpretation of Section 22 should align with constitutional guarantees, ensuring access to appellate review.
Violation of Fair Hearing Principles:
The Court of Appeal introduced and resolved the jurisdictional issue without allowing the appellant an opportunity to be heard, violating the principles of natural justice.
This contradicts Article 28 and Article 42 of the Constitution, which guarantee the right to a fair hearing and just treatment before any judicial or administrative body.
Precedent and Legislative Intent
The Supreme Court should reconsider its prior ruling in Donna Kamuli, as it improperly restricted appellate rights.
Section 22 of LABADA should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Judicature Act, ensuring normal appellate review procedures apply.
The reasoning in 201 Former Employees of G4S Security Services Uganda Ltd v G4S Security Services Uganda Ltd misapplied employment law provisions and should not be followed.
Evidentiary Concerns
The reliance on hearsay evidence, including anonymous witness reports and newspaper articles, was a procedural flaw.
Established legal precedents affirm that critical evidence must be subject to cross-examination to uphold procedural fairness.
Conclusion and Implications
The Supreme Court's ruling on its appellate jurisdiction over decisions from the Court of Appeal arising from the Industrial Court establishes a significant precedent in labor law jurisprudence. The majority decision reaffirmed the principle that appellate jurisdiction must be explicitly provided for by statute, concluding that the Supreme Court lacks the authority to hear appeals from the Court of Appeal in labor disputes originating from the Industrial Court. This reinforces the specialized dispute resolution framework envisioned by Parliament and limits the scope for further appellate review beyond the Court of Appeal.
However, Justice Catherine Bamugemereire’s dissenting opinion highlights important constitutional concerns regarding access to justice, fairness, and the proper interpretation of appellate rights. Her argument that the Industrial Court operates with concurrent jurisdiction to the High Court suggests that appeals from the Court of Appeal should be permissible in labor matters, ensuring consistency in judicial oversight and interpretation of employment laws.
Implications
The ruling establishes the Court of Appeal as the final appellate body for labor disputes unless legislative amendments explicitly provide for further appeal to the Supreme Court. This solidifies the Industrial Court’s specialized role in labor adjudication.
The decision may prompt Parliament to revisit the Labour Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act, 2006, to clarify whether Supreme Court appeals should be permitted in exceptional cases, particularly where constitutional issues or significant points of law arise.
The dissenting judgment raises concerns regarding procedural fairness, particularly where appellate courts raise and determine jurisdictional issues without giving parties an opportunity to be heard. This highlights the need for clearer procedural safeguards in appellate adjudication.
The decision could lead to constitutional petitions challenging the interpretation of Article 132(2) of the Constitution and Section 22 of the Labour Disputes Act. If litigants argue that the restriction of Supreme Court appeals in labor matters undermines fundamental rights, this could lead to future judicial reconsideration of the issue.
Limiting Supreme Court oversight may result in inconsistent interpretations of employment law principles by the Court of Appeal. This could create legal uncertainty for employers and employees, necessitating reliance on legislative or judicial interventions for clarity.
In sum, while the ruling strengthens the existing statutory framework governing labor disputes, it also underscores the tension between legal finality and access to justice. Future legislative amendments or constitutional challenges may be necessary to address concerns regarding appellate jurisdiction and fair hearing rights in labor matters.
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